On 31 March 2015, Burmese President Thein Sein, along with many ethnic leaders and government officials, signed a nationwide ceasefire project. [7] Since 1989, the Burmese government has signed the following ceasefire agreements[10][11] The Fourth Union Peace Conference (UPC or “Panglong Conference”), held in Nay Pyi Taw from August 19 to 21, was the culmination of the final round of the political dialogue framework. A Panglong is intended to be an opportunity for the ANC parties to submit and agree on proposals that together form the Union`s peace agreement. The agreements are signed in a solemn demonstration of unity in diversity and celebrated in effusive speeches by key peace negotiators and national elites. As a country with a history of civil wars, the experiences of communities where conflicts are fought are crucial to understanding and developing methods of conflict resolution and transformation. For example, patterns of conflict in subnational areas of Myanmar vary between the use of heavy artillery and small arms and light weapons (SALW). In many communities, some rural bandits with access to small arms and light weapons participate in armed robberies and deadly fighting with armed mobile Tatmadaw in rural areas. In addition, some women and young people are reported to have participated in ethnic armies (although some have denounced their participation). Therefore, it is important to include feedback from these stakeholders if NCA is to achieve the overarching goal of conflict resolution.

These micro-joint experiments in rural communities would be part of the concerns of the NCA agreement if appropriate consultations were conducted with rural communities. Insufficient consultation with the local population makes the NCA an elite arrangement, limiting all chances of lasting implementation or prevention of new forms of rebellion. (2) The signatories to the Agreement should be reviewed. This step will ensure that the agreement ensures fair representation of AEOs and certifies that their political requirements will be taken into account in the implementation of the ANC and the subsequent institutionalization of democracy. Thein Sein said he would continue his efforts to persuade other groups to join the ceasefire later. Hopes were raised on the 31st. In March 2015, negotiators finalized and initialled a draft agreement that had been approved at the highest levels of government. However, a summit of armed group leaders on June 9 rejected it, proposed several other changes and formed a new negotiating team. They also decided that no group would sign unless all of them did, including three who are currently fighting the army in the Kokang region, which, as the government points out, must first lay down their arms or agree on bilateral ceasefires. As part of the ceasefire, the government launched the Border Areas Development Program in 1989, which in 1992, as the Ministry of Progress of Border Areas and National Races, became a ministry-level agency, building road infrastructure, schools and hospitals in rebel-held territories. [6] The National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) aims to achieve a negotiated solution between the Government of Myanmar and ethnic armed non-governmental organizations (AECs) that paves the way for peacebuilding and national dialogue.

The draft seven-chapter text of the ANC, adopted on 31 March 2015, sets out the conditions for ceasefires, their implementation and follow-up, as well as the roadmap for political dialogue and peace to come. As such, the ANC, if signed by all parties, would represent the first major step in a longer national peace process. While the government, in particular, hopes to see the NCA before the national elections on September 8. Requests to change the final text, ongoing skirmishes and the question of which groups could be excluded from the agreement proved to be stumbling blocks in the negotiations. Myanmar`s government and eight ethnic armed groups on Thursday signed a ceasefire agreement, which culminated in more than two years of negotiations aimed at ending the majority of the country`s longstanding conflicts. First, Myanmar`s military has never been entirely sincere. She reluctantly agreed with the NCA to give credibility to the “transition,” but felt that she had already made enough concessions simply by signing and discussing federalism. But the military continued to pursue a dual strategy by talking to the EAO and playing with the relentless activities of the peace process, while showing little evidence of a change in behavior in Kachin, Kayin and Shan states, as well as its mass crimes against humanity in Rakhine state. There is probably no better understanding of the military`s intransigence than the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC), which has swallowed up about $10 million in international funds, a bunch of care given by China and India, several meetings and no peace for them.

A senior EAO official who attended the JMC meetings noted that this was a lack of sinc, not resolutions. Snr. General Min Aung Haing`s approach was to harass, belittle, brag and incite insults, as he did on the occasion of the third anniversary of the NCA, insulting the head of the RCSS and the Kachin people, and shortly after declaring a unilateral ceasefire for “eternal peace”. .